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I. INTRODUCTION
Health maintenance organizations ("lIMOs") have been broadly ac-
cepted across the country as a tactic to keep healthcare costs under
control. The key issue emerging from widespread HMO adoption is
what happens to the individual patient who suffers negligent medical
assistance or surgery? This exact situation occurred when Patrick
Shea died of heart failure at the age of forty, and his wife, Dianne,
decided that the HMO that provided his medical coverage should be
held responsible.' The family physician, who was under contract with
the HMO, ruled out sending Patrick to a cardiologist even though he
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVmw.
Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC. S.J.D.
(Candidate) (Health Law and Policy), 2000, Loyola University Chicago; LL.M.
(Taxation), 1992, Georgetown University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A.,
M.S., 1974, BA., Syracuse University, 1973.
1. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1997). As part of Mr. Shea's
employer benefit plan, he was required to select one of Medica's primary care
physicians. He chose his personal doctor, and was covered by the Medica policy
for all necessary medical care, including cardiac care. See id.
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had complained of chest pains and shortness of breath. 2 Dianne,
however, contended during litigation that the HMO was legally liable
for her husband's death since it provided financial incentives for the
general practitioners not to refer patients to expensive specialists. 3
The HMO in this case, Minnesota-based Medica, responded with a
familiar litigation strategy. Medica contended that since Patrick re-
ceived his insurance from an employer-sponsored health plan via the
HMO, Dianne could only proceed in federal court pursuant to the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").4 This
seemingly trivial argument was an absolute catastrophe to Dianne
Shea's legal cause of action. It meant that the damages she could re-
cover would be limited to the cost of treatment denied her husband, as
opposed to compensation for wrongful death as tort law would typi-
cally allow. The key difference arises in that under state law, ERISA
would not preempt the allowance of unexpected death damages. How-
ever, if the court concluded that ERISA controlled, then the damages
would be limited significantly.5
As a result, Mrs. Shea's only option was to file a claim based on the
argument that a fiduciary responsibility was created by the HMO's
2. See id. at 626. Medica's primary care doctors received payments for not making
referrals to expensive specialists. Mrs. Shea argued that had her husband known
this, he would have paid for the cardiologist at his own expense and probably
saved his life by doing so. See id. at 627.
3. See id. at 627. The issue of financial incentives was a focal point of the pleading
battle between the two parties, as Mrs. Shea amended her initial complaint to
uncover this fact and thereby argue the breach of fiduciary duties emanating
from Medica as a result of ERISA. See Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21), 1104(a)(1) (1994). The district court
dismissed the amended complaint holding that the undisclosed, behind-the-
scenes compensation arrangements were not "'material facts affecting a benefici-
ary's interests.'" See id. at 627.
4. See id. at 627. In language used in a number of similar HMO cases that involved
the ERISA removal issue, the Eighth Circuit stated that "ERISA supersedes
state laws insofar as they 'relate to any employee benefit plan.'" Id. (quoting
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1144(a). This language from the ERISA statute has been used
in a number of cases to support similar HMO immunity arguments.
5. Mr. Shea's damage recovery under ERISA would have been limited to the actual
cost of the specialist treatment denied with no consideration of state tort claims,
such as wrongful death. However, the district court was far more focused on the
nature of the fiduciary relationship between Medica and the patients. The circuit
court stated that "the duty of loyalty requires an ERISA fiduciary to communi-
cate any material facts which could adversely affect a plan member's interests."
Id. at 628 (quoting Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994)). Quoting Eddy
v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the same court
stated, "[t]he duty to disclose material information is the core of a fiduciary's re-
sponsibility, animating the common law of trusts long before the enactment of
ERISA." Id.
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relationship with the physician and the patient.6 The chances of win-
ning on this argument in state or federal court are not nearly as good
as on a simple state tort claim because a fiduciary stands in high re-
gard. Mrs. Shea, however, refused to let her lawsuit die. Medica set-
tled the claim after the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the
District Court's decision upholding Medica's motion to dismiss on the
bases of ERISA preemption and that the fiduciary issue was too novel
a legal theory on which to base a claim.7
A similar case, Herdrich v. Pegram,8 unfolded in the Seventh Cir-
cuit with a final decision rendered on August 18, 1998. In Herdrich,
the patient, Cynthia Herdrich, complained to physician Pegram of ab-
dominal pains.9 Pegram worked as a providing physician under the
Carle Clinic Association, P.C., ("Carle"), an HMO that paid its partici-
pating physicians annual "cost containment" payments for keeping
the total cost of medical care low.O In Ms. Herdrich's case, Dr.
Pegram made a grave malpractice error and elected to delay immedi-
ate further treatment that would have diagnosed her impending ap-
pendix rupture. Instead, Dr. Pegram sent Ms. Herdrich home where
her appendix ruptured, and she contracted peritonitis as a result of
Dr. Pegram's negligence.ii
Ms. Herdrich sued Dr. Pegram for negligence and malpractice.
She also sued Carle for breach of fiduciary duty under the ERISA stat-
ute, since the HIMO provided a cash incentive to its physicians. She
ultimately received a malpractice settlement against Dr. Pegram.12
Carle chose to whisk the case into safe arms of an ERISA defense sim-
ilar to that faced by Mrs. Shea in the case mentioned above, and to
keep low-key the counter-argument that cost containment payments
6. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997). However, the Eighth
Circuit soon noted its disagreement with the district court's conclusion that there
had been a breach of fiduciary duty:
ERISA supersedes state laws insofar as they 'relate to any employee
plan.' 29 U.S.C. §1144(a). To this end, the language of ERISA's preemp-
tion clause sweeps broadly, embracing common law causes of action if
they have a connection with or a reference to an ERISA plan. Here,
Medica administered Seagate's employee benefit plan, and Mrs. Shea
maintains Medica wrongfully failed to disclose a major limitation on her
husband's healthcare benefits. Along these lines, we have held that
claims of misconduct against the administrator of an employer's health
plan fall comfortably with ERISA's broad preemption provision.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. See id. at 628-29.
8. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 10
(U.S. Sept. 28, 1999)(No. 98-1949).
9. See id. at 365.
10. Id. at 372-73.
11. See id. at 374.
12. See id. at 365.
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do not constitute grounds for a breach of fiduciary cause of action. 3l
While little mention was made of the incentive nature of the program
by Carle, Seventh Circuit Judge John L. Coffey saw the case differ-
ently and ruled that the "specter" of doctors receiving yearly kickbacks
for withholding medical treatment cast a great shadow of doubt on
whose interest the physician represented.14 The Herdrich case was
argued before the United States Supreme Court on Wednesday, Feb-
ruary 23, 2000, and promises to be a critical opinion in the managed
care debate.
Clearly, the area of health law is increasingly becoming something
of the Wild West with regard to coverages and whether or not health-
care organizations are doing what they promised to do when they en-
tered the scene ten to fifteen years ago. First, this article will examine
the ERISA statute as a shield to HMO litigation and review a number
of the common law tort theories used in various courts in medical mal-
practice cases against a managed care organization ("MCO").15 In
these latter cases, courts held that ERISA did not apply or could not
be relied upon to restrict damages, thereby wrecking the absolute
first-line HMO defense. Finally, some discussion will be offered re-
garding actions filed under the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") and state legislative action taken to deal with this problem
on an individual basis.16 To conclude, the HMO patients' fear that
with a patchwork of case law and statutes put forward by legislatures
and individual plaintiffs attorneys, the likelihood increases that what
will emerge is a hodgepodge of solutions geared strictly to get around
the ERISA preemption clause. As a result, this article theorizes that
ERISA should be held as inapplicable to managed healthcare pro-
grams. This goal could be achieved either through an appropriate de-
cision by the United States Supreme Court in Herdrich, a decision
comparable to that in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,i 7 or an
outright Congressional codicil to ERISA more strictly prohibiting its
application to MCOs. Any of these would strip MCOs of their two
13. See id. at 380.
14. See id. at 373. The court stated: "Under the terms of ERISA, Herdrich most cer-
tainly has raised the specter that the self-dealing physician/owners in this appeal
were not acting 'solely in the interest of the participants' of the Plan." Id. (quot-
ing ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)). As ERISA points out very clearly, a fiduciary
must put the interests of the participants ahead of all others. See id.
15. See infra Parts III, IV, V.
16. See infra Part VI.
17. 504 U.S. 374 (1992). In Morales, the Texas Attorney General, among others, as-
serted the right to regulate allegedly unfair and deceptive airline fare advertise-
ments. The airline defendant argued that the term "relates to" in ERISA meant
that anything related to "rates or routes" was governed by ERISA, and individual
state regulation was preempted. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant.
Id. at 390.
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most formidable defenses: removal to federal court and reliance on the
preemption clause of ERISA.
By removing a cap on damages, HMOs will be held accountable for
all malpractice actions, forcing them to realize that they are in a "life
and death" business. The ERISA statute essentially works as a shield
that must be stripped away in order to insure equity and fairness of
care in the medical field. Medical professionals need to understand
that HMO-provided health coverage does not protect against the gar-
den-variety medical malpractice claim.
II. ERISA AS AN HMO LITIGATION SHIELD
ERISA's critical problem is that Congress did not pass it to deal
with healthcare cases at all. Instead, Congress designed it to regulate
retirement programs and ensure that individual companies properly
funded and provided fair vesting requirements for employees' retire-
ment programs.iS However, skillful lawyers have found ways to use
the damages cap in the ERISA statute in ways in which Congress did
not intend when it passed ERISA in 1974.19
Why should Congress be so reluctant to pass healthcare legislation
now, at a time when it is clearly long overdue? The political nature of
this issue provides one answer. The issue of healthcare has been
bounced around like a rubber ball. Republicans played healthcare
turmoil, created by the Clinton Administration when the President at-
tempted to have his wife solve the healthcare problem, to the political
hilt. It quickly became clear that Congress lost all interest in finding
a solution, and all that mattered was posturing for the 2000 elections.
In short, healthcare is now a highly politicized issue, highly partisan
in a presidential election year, and no one can expect a solution any
time soon.
One bright spot on this cloudy horizon, however, should not be
overlooked. A bill proposed by the House would have amended ERISA
to add an external review allowing patients to challenge a denial of
benefits and not effect ERISA's preemption of suits. 20 Unfortunately,
this proposal was narrowly defeated in the summer of 1999, and the
Committee which brought the bill to the floor is uncertain whether
similar action will occur during a presidential election year.21
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, a Republican from Mississippi
and resident Cheshire Cat in the healthcare debate, has made it clear
18. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994).
19. See infra Part III.
20. See generally Peter Aronson, Congress Squares Off Over HMO Liability, NAT'L L.
J., June 21, 1999, at Al; Harvey Berkman, New Suits Pre-Empt HMO Move by
House, NAT'L L. J., October 18, 1999, at Al.
21. See Berkman, supra note 20.
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that there will be no movement on this issue until after the election.2 2
He will apparently use any opportunity to preclude meaningful debate
of the issue; resolution will not occur under his watch in order to avoid
the appearance of a Democratic victory. In the meantime, the courts
are clogged with cases that await resolution of this particular issue.2 3
If the question were left up to Douglas A. Hastings the answer would
be quite simple. Mr. Hastings' article recently published in The Na-
tional Law Journal, HMO Suits Threaten Efficiency, states: "Let's face
it, there is no plan B. We have to make managed care work... and
the reality is that to deal with the daunting problem of the uninsured,
we are going to have to continue to promote and support cost
efficiency."2 4
According to Mr. Hastings, the issue and the answer are obvious:
allow HMOs to operate under the current ERISA statutory environ-
ment, unencumbered by any state tort claim that would permit indi-
viduals such as Patrick Shea to seek judiciary redemption. Clearly
Mr. Shea deserves more than the Hastings Plan A, whatever that is.
Mr. Hastings' conclusion is unconscionably callous in light of the fact
that Congressional politics bog down the HMO issue. The answer
here is quite clear. The time has come to bridle ERISA,25 either judi-
cially or via statute, so that corporations understand that ERISA was
not meant to protect them from corporate-managed answers where
the bottom line looked profitable, or at least until the plan was
implemented.
More specifically, ERISA was not intended to place caps on well-
founded claims brought in medical healthcare cases. If federal courts
want to take claims on a diversity basis that have their foundation in
state tort claims, then those cases should be litigated relative to the
merits of state common law. HMOs should be required to get out from
behind the comfortable shield of ERISA and other statutory laws and
defend their positions accordingly.
Mr. Hastings would like the federal government to take a more ac-
tive role, "to focus on making Medicare work in a managed care envi-
ronment."2 6 The federal government, however, has not made
managed care work efficiently and apparently has no intention of do-
ing so during this upcoming election year. Mr. Hastings' position may
also be buttressed by his firm's representation of one or more large
HMOs that stand to lose a multitude of state tort claim actions if
22. See Aronson, supra note 20, at A10.
23. See Berkman, supra note 20.
24. Douglas A. Hastings, HMO Suits Threaten Efficiency, NAT'L L. J., November 29,
1999, at A15.
25. See H.R. Res. 2990, 1061 Cong. (1999)(making cost-efficiency illegal in the name
of patient protection).
26. See Hastings, supra note 24 at A15.
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stripped of their ERISA statutory shield.2 7 To counter Mr. Hastings'
proposals, plaintiff patients' lawyers must shrewdly define their
causes of action, such that they can remain intact within the confines
of state tort law even though HMOs will remove the case to federal
court under diversity jurisdiction. Again, this is no small undertak-
ing, and state tort lawyers know that. Further, the ERISA federal
court damages shield remains unanswered with the Herdrich decision
outstanding.
Plaintiffs are also hampered by the reality that plaintiffs' lawyers
with experience in state court may be uncomfortable or inexperienced
in litigating federal cases. Consequently, as soon as removal to fed-
eral court via diversity jurisdiction occurs, the plaintiffs attorney may
lose some zest and zeal in prosecuting the case to its conclusion. The
large law firms know this, especially since they are well-staffed with
individuals whose practices are highly specialized and include a fed-
eral litigation division. 28 Consequently, the plaintiffs lawyer should
draft the complaint in such a way that the state law cause of action
will pass muster as a state tort law claim. This ties the federal court's
hands and the HIMO no longer gets the home field advantage, beyond
the more extensive resources that an HMO's legal team tends to bring
to the counsel table. If the plaintiffs attorney can overcome this hur-
dle, chances for settlement increase.
III. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. Negligence
Negligence, when dealing with a medical malpractice claim, is one
of the most common tort claims. Therefore, a plaintiffs lawyer com-
monly looks first at an HMO health plan to see whether or not the
plan has any room to enunciate a legal cause of action for plan negli-
gence. 2 9 Under this ideal cause of action, damages are essentially un-
limited and the jury gets an opportunity to look at all treatment that
the individual patient received, did not receive, or was denied.30 Un-
fortunately, the ERISA statute restricts this particular claim by limit-
ing plaintiffs to contract damages only in federal court. This
limitation was mentioned above with regard to not permitting the
plaintiff to recover wrongful death damages.31
Even though the majority still holds this view, the United States
Department of Labor advocates an even narrower view of the ERISA
27. Author's prerogative. See Hastings, supra note 24.
28. See id. at A15.
29. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
30. Id.
31. See supra note 5.
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preemption statute.32 Clearly, this position is even more anti-patient
and anti-consumer than that which has been perpetrated by MCOs.33
Unfortunately for the United States Department of Labor and the
HMOs, the judiciary has shown no signs of interest in this narrower
preemption. Courts have held that quality of care suits ought not be
preempted where the health plan procedure provides that the physi-
cian perform negligently and the only remedy is to have the cause go
forward under the state law claim.
A 1998 Pennsylvania case last addressed this distinction. In Pap-
pas v. Asbel,34 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a third party, the
United States Healthcare Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc. ("U.S.
Healthcare).35 Although the appellate court relied on different rea-
sons from those enunciated by the Superior Court, it nevertheless pre-
empted the claims made and affirmed the order of the Superior
Court.3 6
In Pappas, Haverford Community Hospital admitted the patient to
the emergency room late in the morning of May 21, 1991, complaining
of paralysis and numbness in his extremities. 37 During his admission,
he was an insured of HMO-PA, an HMO operated by U.S. Health-
care.38 The emergency room physician concluded that the patient was
suffering from an epidural abscess and, after consultation with a neu-
rologist and a neurosurgeon who concurred, it was decided that Mr.
Pappas' condition constituted a neurological emergency.3 9 Given
these circumstances, the attending physician felt it necessary that it
was in the patient's best interest to receive treatment at a university
hospital. 40 Dr. Dickter, the attending emergency room physician,
made arrangements to transfer Mr. Pappas to Jefferson University
Hospital.4 ' At about 12:40 P.M. on the afternoon of May 21, 1991,
when the ambulance arrived and Dr. Dickter was prepared to trans-
port Mr. Pappas to the receiving hospital, he received word that U.S.
Healthcare denied authorization for treatment at Jefferson.42
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Dickter contacted U.S. Healthcare to obtain
authorization for his transfer and, at about 1:15 P.M., the HMO re-
32. See supra note 20.
33. See infra Part III.
34. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 13,
1999)(No. 98-1836).
35. See id. at 890.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. 724 A.2d 889, 890 (Pa. 1998).
41. See id.
42. See id.
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sponded to the inquiry. It advised that the authorization for treat-
ment was still denied but that the physician could transfer the patient
to Hahnemann University, Temple University or the Medical College
of Pennsylvania.4 3 Hahnemann was immediately contacted and ad-
vised of the situation.44 It took until 2:20 P.M. for that institution to
respond that it could not possibly be prepared to take him for at least
a half hour.4 5 At that point the Medical College of Pennsylvania was
contacted and within minutes it agreed to accept Pappas, who was
ultimately transported there at 3:30 P.M.46 Not too surprisingly, as a
result of the loss in precious treatment time, the patient suffered per-
manent injuries as a direct result of the compression on his spine by
the abscess. 47 Mr. Pappas and his wife filed suit against Dr. Asbel,
his primary care physician, and Haverford claiming, respectively,
medical malpractice and negligence for not arranging a timely trans-
fer in order to handle his emergency.48 Haverford then filed a third
party complaint against U.S. Healthcare, which joined Haverford as a
third party defendant, for U.S. Healthcare's refusal to authorize a
transfer to the hospital selected by the Haverford physicians.4 9 The
third party lawsuit also included a cross-claim against U.S. Health-
care seeking contribution and indemnity.5 0
Consistent with the current jurisdictional custom, U.S. Healthcare
came forth with a motion for summary judgment on the third party
claims, alleging that ERISA preempted the claims.5 1 The Superior
Court noted that one method of preemption U.S. Healthcare relied on
was that the statute includes a clause providing for express preemp-
tion where states have statutes that "relate to" the issue at hand.52
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the parties agreed that the
United States Supreme Court has yet to speak directly to the issue of
whether negligence claims against an HMO "relate to" an ERISA
plan.5 3
The Court has addressed this issue with regard to airline advertis-
ing in Morales v. Trans World Airlines.5 4 In Morales, the Attorney
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. 724 A.2d 889, 890 (Pa. 1998).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 890-91.
52. Id.
53. Id. The express preemption provision of the ERISA statute provides that "the
provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... " ERISA, 29
U.S.C. §1144(a).
54. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
20001
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
General of Texas wanted to regulate airline advertising under the
Texas Consumer Deception Act but could not because the Supreme
Court found airline advertising to be the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's prerogative. 55 This ruling rested on the conclusion that
airfares, routes and rates "relate to" the issue of aviation and airline
regulation.56
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that briefs by U.S. Health-
care brought forth a number of these cases, obviously aruging that
HMOs should be regulated accordingly.5 7 Fortunately, the Penn-
sylvania Court relied on the Supreme Court's Travelers line of cases in
which the Court purposely reined in the expansive of view previously
taken in the Morales case.5 8 This is not to say that the Morales deci-
sion was too broad, but the Travelers line of cases is more limited in
scope and suitable for application to MCOs. Perhaps the critical case
in that line is the DeBuono59 case, in which a hospital questioned the
New York gross receipts tax as applied to hospitals that operated
under ERISA plans.60
The DeBuono Court found the language "relates to" unhelpful and
instead evaluated Congress' intent in enacting ERISA to determine
whether state law indeed meant for the ERISA preemptive scope to
cover this type of situation. The Court concluded that ERISA did not
preempt the gross receipts tax since it was "one of myriad state laws of
general applicability that impose some burdens of the administration
of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not relate to them within the stat-
ute's meaning ... ,"61 Based on the strength of this language, and
even though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that it supported
U.S. Healthcare's position that "the preemption provision" in ERISA
should be read broadly, it had no choice but to follow the line of rea-
soning put forth in the Travelers and DeBuono case lines.62 The Pap-
pas court concluded that negligence claims against a health
maintenance organization do not "relate to" an ERISA plan as sup-
ported by Travelers.63
55. See Jack E. Karns et. al., The Policy Conflict Between State and Federal Govern-
ment Efforts to Regulate Airline Advertising, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 647 (1996).
56. See id.
57. See 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998).
58. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
59. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806
(1997).
60. 520 U.S. at 807.
61. Id.
62. 724 A.2d at 893.
63. Id.
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In 1995, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.64 first put forward the basic
issues discussed in Pappas v. Asbel. Dukes, a Third Circuit case, in-
volved two cases filed in state court against HMOs managed and run
by U.S. Healthcare.6 5 The plaintiffs in both cases claimed damages
arising during medical procedures provided by HMO affiliated hospi-
tals and personnel under a variety of theories. 66 U.S. Healthcare re-
moved both of these cases to federal court pursuant to the ERISA
statute and argued that, because the plaintiffs received employer pro-
vided welfare benefit plans, the federal statute preempted any state
tort claim. 67 U.S. Healthcare went even further to argue that there
was complete preemption pursuant to the "well pleaded complaint
rule," and accordingly, the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the
respective district courts.6 8
The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not covered by em-
ployer benefit plans as envisioned by the ERISA statute, thereby evis-
cerating the preemption exception heavily relied upon by U.S.
Healthcare. 6 9 It reversed the judgments of the district courts with re-
spect to this particular issue and remanded each case to the appropri-
ate district court with instructions that the cases be remanded to the
state courts from which they had been previously removed.7 0 Al-
though the facts are extremely detailed and recount a variety of mis-
treatments afforded several patients at the hands of the defendant, a
recitation of the facts in each case is not necessary in order to fully
appreciate the consolidated review provided by the Third Circuit.71
The missing factual backgrounds are merely emblematic of those al-
ready reviewed in various other cases where the HMO possessed the
superior litigation position, such as in Shea and Herdrich.
U.S. Healthcare's strategy in this case began with its strongest ar-
gument and moved to its weakest via interpretation of language
within the ERISA statute.7 2 First of all, with the direct preemption
clause overruled and reversed outright, U.S. Healthcare fell back to
its second position, in which they alleged that the district court lacked
original jurisdiction since the claim had arisen from the Constitution
and laws of the United States.7 3 For U.S. Healthcare, as long as ER-
ISA preemption worked, everything was fine. But as soon as the pre-
emption argument failed, their next step was to attack the court's
64. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
65. See id. at 351.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 351-52.
70. 57 F.3d 350, 351-52.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 353-55.
73. See id. at 353.
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jurisdictional base. The Court, citing Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company,74 held that when a cause of action arises under a federal
law and removal is proper, removal is based upon whether or not the
plaintiffs' petition properly presents a federal question.7 5
The Third Circuit stated that "a federal defense to a plaintiffs'
state law cause of action ordinarily does not appear on the face of the
well pleaded complaint, and, therefore, usually is insufficient to war-
rant removal to federal court."7 6 This statement meant that U.S.
Healthcare's second defense did not justify removal to federal court.7 7
In these particular cases, the district courts found that the state law
claims against U.S. Healthcare fell within the scope of § 502 (a)(1)(B)
of the statute, thereby triggering the Metropolitan Life "complete pre-
emption doctrine".78
The Third Circuit disagreed.79 First, it analyzed the state law
claims, considering whether or not they fell within the scope of section
502; the court determined that they did not.8 0 Second, the HMO ar-
gued that the medical care received by the patients was itself the plan
benefit and this brought the ERISA statute into play. The court also
rejected this argument.8 1 Finally, the court considered U.S. Health-
care's characterization of the plaintiffs' state court complaints as at-
tempts to enforce their "rights under the terms of the respective
welfare plans."8 2 This constituted yet another effort to bootstrap the
language of ERISA within the purview of section 502, thus bringing it
within coverage of the Metropolitan Life case. The Circuit Court noted
that no plan-created right existed that was implicated by the plain-
tiffs' merely having a state medical plan, nor could state law medical
malpractice claims be ignored simply because a state employer pro-
vided the plan as a benefit.8 3 The court's analysis concluded with the
finding that the plaintiffs were not really trying to define new
rights.84 They were simply attempting to enforce rights that already
existed under a state law-recognized benefits plan.8 5
74. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
75. 57 F.3d 350 at 353.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 356.
78. See id. at 354.
79. See id. at 356.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 356-57.
82. 57 F.3d 350 at 357.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 358.
85. See id.
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B. Agency Theory
Plaintiffs have achieved almost as much success in pursuing
claims against healthcare organizations under common law theories of
agency as they have in using negligence. Some plaintiffs might even
argue that they have had more success arguing apparent authority
and vicarious liability when seeking damages under agency theory.
This article not only reviews the various state claims and federal stat-
utory claims that a plaintiff might use in a healthcare case, but also
briefly summarizes some of the various theories used in successful ac-
tions against HIOs. This section summarizes cases where plaintiffs
successfully used the agency theory to establish a valid cause of action
able to withstand the ERISA preemption claim.
The State of Illinois has been especially successful in fostering law-
suits based upon the theory of vicarious liability, apparent authority,
and agency theory against HMOs during the past five years.8 6 The
Illinois Supreme Court has exercised extremely broad latitude when
deciding upon damages for patients who have been injured as a result
of actions by health organizations.8 7 This has been particularly true
when the HMO held itself out as being the provider of the healthcare,
but did not inform the patient that the care was given by an indepen-
dent contractor physician, who was under a contractual relationship
with the HMO.88 To this extent, the patients "justifiably relied" on
the HMO's conduct and they looked to the organization, instead of the
particular physician involved, to provide a high level of medical
care.8 9 As a result, plaintiffs have been making cases for implied au-
thority since they could demonstrate that the HMO exerted control
over the doctor and negated any independent contractor status that
the individual physician may have exercised on an outward basis to a
third party patient.9 0
In Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois,91 the plaintiff brought
a medical malpractice action against a physician for failure to timely
diagnose oral cancer.9 2 However, the plaintiff also included the HMO
in the complaint, arguing that the company was vicariously liable for
its independent contractor's negligence pursuant to agency law.93
Plaintiff premised the malpractice claim on both apparent and implied
86. See Francis A. Citera and Ann M. Ungvarsky, High Court Rules on HMO Liabil-
ity, Evidence, Torts, NAT'L L. J., November 8, 1999, at B1l.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999).
92. See id. at 760.
93. See id.
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authority concepts of agency law.94 The trial court ruled in favor of
defendants while the intermediate appellate reversed.9 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the HMO's leave to appeal, and then ruled that
the plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits of vicarious liability
as prescribed under apparent and implied authority.96
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
One of the most interesting common law claims employed to avoid
ERISA preemption has been breach of fiduciary duty, despite its
shortcomings relative to trustee standards. The Introduction above
briefly discussed this claim as applied in the Shea and Herdrich cases
where the plaintiffs argued that the HMO established a fiduciary duty
between itself and the providing physicians by exercising so much con-
trol over the procedures that had to be followed, as well as providing a
monetary incentive to keep medical costs low. 9 7 For example, quality
medical treatment was delayed for Patrick Shea, who was suffering
from chest pains but was not referred to a cardiac specialist. Mrs.
Shea argued that the delay occurred because the physician had an in-
centive to keep costs low, and thus was a fiduciary of the HMO when
there was a failure to render a correct medical judgment. This trig-
gered the breach of duty argument under common law and concomi-
tant potential liability on the part of the HMO.98
This theory now looms large on the horizon as a result of the Su-
preme Court having heard the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case,
Herdrich v. Pegram99 on February 23, 2000. Herdrich arose when
Cynthia Herdrich filed a complaint against Lori Pegram, M.D., and
the providing HMO, the Carle Clinic Association, P.C., alleging that
her ruptured appendix and peritonitis resulted from professional med-
ical malpractice.10 0 Given that the physician was part of an HMO
plan, the case was argued in federal court with the HMO using the
usual ERISA preemption as its primary line of defense, which the
court did not receive favorably.lOl The major issue in the case was
fiduciary duty, which got a boost when the Seventh Circuit endorsed
it. Carle appealed to the Supreme Court.102
94. See id. The court stated: "We hold that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evi-
dence to entitle her to a trial on whether Share [the HMO] is vicariously liable
under the doctrines of apparent and implied authority." Id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
99. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
100. See id. at 365.
101. See id. at 366.
102. See id.
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Herdrich's legal counsel made all the proper common law tort and
statutory claims imaginable but included one that was somewhat
unique. In count three, the complaint asserted that the defendants
acted as fiduciaries to the plan and, as a result of operating as fiducia-
ries pursuant to the ERISA statute, the plaintiff should be given wide
latitude with regard to recovery.10 3 The plaintiff bolstered this argu-
ment with references to the ERISA statute's legislative history as well
applicable case law.10 4 This represented a significant change from
other claims that had been argued not only in this complaint but in
other cases as well, since it proposed that a significant trustee-like
relationship existed between the HMO and the physician providing
the medical care. The Seventh Circuit concluded "that the defendants
are fiduciaries under ERISA" and then next considered whether or not
there had been a breach of fiduciary duty.1 05 Again, the court ex-
amined the ERISA statute carefully with regard to the requirements
necessary for such a breach to occur. The court noted that the single
most important requirement set forth by ERISA is that the court look
with an eye to promoting the interests of the participants and the ben-
eficiaries, in accordance with judicial guidance.oe
The sine que non for the Seventh Circuit was that Herdrich alleged
a flaw that "springs from the authority of physician/owners of Carle to
simultaneously control the care of their patients and reap the profits
generated by the HMO through the limited use of tests and refer-
rals."'10 7 The Court viewed this as raising the possibility of self-deal-
ing between the HMO and physicians and thereby triggering the
breach of fiduciary duty possibility.10 '
The Herdrich case represented a major departure from other cases
that have been reviewed in this article. Herdrich's attorneys did not
include this departure in their complaint, knowing that it could create
cross-claims and counterclaims that might be difficult to fend off in
litigation.109 However, the handful of cases utilizing this theory have
been successful, and now there is a string of cases for attorneys to rely
103. See id. at 366-67.
104. See id. at 366-69; 120 CoNG. REC. 3877, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974) reprinted in 2 Legis-
lative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 3293.
105. See Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 370; see ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(21) for the definition
of fiduciary.
106. See 154 F.3d at 370.
107. Id. at 373.
108. Id. The court stated:
Our point is not that a fiduciary may not have dual loyalties; it is that
the tolerance of dual loyalties does not extend to the situation like the
case before us where a fiduciary jettisons his responsibility to the physi-
cal well-being of beneficiaries in favor of 'loyalty' to his own financial
interests. Tolerance, in other words, has its limits.
109. See id. at 374-375.
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upon as precedent to press this claim forward to an even higher
level.110
This particular theory, however, has not always met with such suc-
cess. In Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare,n i' a New York District Court de-
cided that even though a fiduciary duty existed between the physician/
HMO and the patient, the HMO did not violate its fiduciary duties
when it gave physicians financial incentives to lower their patients'
rates of hospitalization and referrals to specialists. 1 2 Clearly, this
issue goes to the very core of the general acceptance of managed
healthcare and the reason why the judiciary must embrace the breach
of duty cause of action. When managed organizations actually provide
financial incentives for physicians not to make costly referrals, the pa-
tient inherently distrusts the equity of the entire healthcare network
system. 1 3 The key question will be which of the two approaches the
Supreme Court will choose to take in Herdrich. One member of the
Supreme Court even questioned during oral argument whether this is
an issue better left to the legislature and not the courts." 4
IV. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Given the strictures of the ERISA preemption provision, attorneys
have looked for creative ways to get around it. One Texas attorney
represented a number of health plan members in a lawsuit filed under
the American With Disabilities Act ("ADA7).115 The patients and two
physicians filed an action against an HMO pursuant to the ADA, seek-
ing compensatory and punitive damages as well as other appropriate
relief under Texas state law.1 6 The defendants filed a motion to dis-
miss, as well as a motion for summary judgment.117 The District
110. See id.
111. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
112. See id. at 743-755.
113. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 375 (7th Cir. 1998). The Herdrich court
quoted a well-known medical journal:
The specter of money concerns driving the healthcare systems, says a
group of Massachusetts physicians and nurses, 'threaten[s] to transform
healing from a covenant into a business contract. Canons of commerce
are displacing dictates of healing, trampling our professions' most sacred
values. Market medicine treats patients as profit centers.'
For Our Patients Not for Profits: A Call to Action, JAMA, Dec. 3, 1997, at 1773.
114. Justice O'Connor asked, "Why should the courts get involved in this messy busi-
ness" of deciding the boundaries of when a business has gone too far? AP Press
Report, Washington, D.C. February 24, 2000.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
116. Quezada v. HealthTexas Med. Group of San Antonio, 43 F. Supp.2d 433 (W.D.
Tex. 1998).
117. See id. at 438.
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Court denied both motions because the plaintiffs raised a genuine is-
sue of material fact in suggesting the possibility of discrimination.11s
The plaintiffs alleged that the pressure on physicians who partici-
pated in the managed care plan to keep costs under control discrimi-
nated against disabled patients, placing them in a relationship with
their physicians that directly violated the ADA.139 The plaintiffs fur-
ther claimed that this denied them full and equal enjoyment of medi-
cal treatment and services in violation of the discrimination statute,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.120 The defendants' primary de-
fense was that the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative rem-
edies pursuant to the Medicare Act before bringing this litigation in
federal court. The District Court held that remedy exhaustion was not
required as a prerequisite to bringing an ADA suit, and that any HMO
member was eligible to bring such litigation if he or she was dissatis-
fied with the health service he or she received.121 The key to this par-
ticular issue was that the state law claims that were sheltered under
the ADA did not "arise under" the act itself.122 The District Court also
noted that even if it agreed with the defendants' argument, the pay-
ment of benefits retrospectively would not remedy the plaintiffs' claim
made under the Act.123
The court also denied Humana's claim that the plaintiffs had no
standing to seek monetary relief, since the HMO argued that the
plaintiffs had no right to seek monetary relief and could not prove that
there was any likelihood of an immediate or substantial risk of dis-
crimination in the future.124 These are statutory requirements of
ADA. Obviously, by making these arguments the HMO was hoping to
get the case back to where it could engage the ERISA preemption stat-
ute and pay nothing in the process.' 25 Unfortunately, as the court
pointed out, "it is defendants' burden to demonstrate there is no rea-
sonable expectation the wrong will be repeated."' 26
Finally, the HIMO argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted pursuant to the ADA.127 For good
measure, the defendant HIMO also argued that the Texas Medical
Practices Act "forbids the corporate practice of medicine and plaintiffs
cannot recover under a joint venture theory of recovery."' 28 If defend-
118. See id. at 440.
119. See id. at 439.
120. See id.; ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
121. Quezada, 34 F. Supp.2d at 440.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 441.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 441.
127. See id. at 444.
128. Id.
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ants wish to have plaintiffs' complaint dismissed on the theory that
medicine cannot be practiced via a corporate or joint venture entity in
the State of Texas, then how is medicine being practiced in that State
at the present time? On its face, this seems to be a somewhat self-
defeating argument. Nevertheless, Humana moved forward and the
Court denied this defense.1 2 9
Because of the sophisticated nature in which the healthcare orga-
nizations had been assembled for Humana to own Health Texas, it
operates offices within the State of Texas in a manner sufficient to
validate the control element claim that the plaintiffs made in their
complaint pursuant to the ADA.130 Put another way, the District
Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not make a joint venture claim
and, therefore, such a claim was not available for dismissal or sum-
mary judgment. However, the plaintiffs were prohibited from assert-
ing any type of joint venture argument later in the proceedings.1 3 i
The real travesty of this defense argument is that the seamless web
referred to in the pleadings is most often concocted by those firms rep-
resenting the HMOs.132 In summary, the Texas District Court held
that a properly pleaded complaint alleging compensatory and punitive
damages pursuant to the ADA and requesting relief under state law
could stand muster against an HMO and not necessarily be preempted
by the ERISA statute.133
V. RICO
One extremely powerful theory supporting a patient-plaintiffs
claim against an HMO can be employed under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").134 As a litigation
remedy, RICO has not been tested in civil actions in the area of man-
aged care liability. However, in at least one case the way has been
cleared for a RICO case to be brought against an MCO. In Humana v.
Forsyth,1 35 the plaintiff argued that the health plan engaged in a pat-
tern of wrongdoing by overcharging members relative to co-pay-
ments. 3 6 The attorney who represented approximately sixty plan
members on a pro bono basis noted that the healthcare field is a new
129. See id.
130. See id. at 444-445.
131. See id. at 445.
132. See id. at 444-445.
133. See id. at 445-446.
134. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
135. 827 F. Supp. 1498 (D. Nev. 1993); 114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997); 119 S. Ct. 710
(1999). The Supreme Court also permitted the Solicitor General, 119 S. Ct. 24
(1998), and the Consumer Credit Insurance Association, 119 S. Ct. 25 (1998), to
file amicus curiae briefs.
136. See 827 F. Supp. at 1501-02.
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area for the type of large-scale wrongdoing that RICO intended to
deter.137
The case that opened the door essentially held that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,138 which protects insurance companies from federal
laws impairing a state's ability to regulate insurance, was not effec-
tive. 13 9 Consequently, the patient could bring a civil RICO action
against the managed care company, as could her similarly situated co-
members.' 40 Admittedly, a RICO claim in a complaint against a man-
aged care company is a long shot. Defense attorneys argue that it
equates with simply throwing any available theory at the HMO and
seeing what will hit the target.' 4 ' These lawyers should understand,
however, that in any case where the plaintiffs can show a large scale
active fraud by a managed care company that adversely affects all pol-
icyholders and rises to a racketeering level commensurate with that of
similar cases, courts may allow RICO to reach the healthcare field.
Also, remembering that this article presents theories and claims
under state law or federal law that escape the ERISA preemption, fi-
nessing the subtle nuances of RICO will be well worth the effort
should it prove to be successful in reaching an equitable settlement in
one healthcare case.
VI. STATE ACTIONS
As Congress wrestles with the question of HMO liability, the states
are not standing idly by with respect to taking legislative action on
their own. These types of state statutes encompass a wide variety of
liability legislation, such as guaranteeing minimum benefits.142 For
example, an HMO would be required to cover at least two days for
certain procedures instead of one.1 43 Perhaps the most hotly con-
tested issue in this particular area is the one versus two-day coverage
question for women who have just had babies. Mothers and obstetri-
cians want a second day of hospital time while HMOs would treat
childbirth on an outpatient basis, if they could. Achieving this change
required much uproar.
Another approach gaining a high degree of acceptability and pref-
erence among the various states is one that guarantees health plan
members the right to appeal any decision made by an HMO regarding
137. See Milo Geyelin, Unhealthy Bias, A Disabled Attorney Puts Civil-Rights Spin on
HMO Litigation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2000, at Al.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
139. See id.
140. 119 S. Ct. 710, 718-19 (1999).
141. See infra note 151; Quezada, 34 F. Supp.2d 433.
142. See infra note 151.
143. See, e.g., Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp.2d 597,
602-03 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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the medical necessity of a particular treatment. 44 The problem lies
in establishing the review mechanism and determining its cost cover-
age as well as any appeal rights. Also, choosing and qualifying
mediators or arbitrators poses a problem. This could create an addi-
tional layer of bureaucracyi45 that may make as many problems as it
solves.
HMOs fear most that the state legislatures will pass bills that per-
mit or guarantee patients the right to sue HMOs. Managed care will
not admit it, but this type of action brings with it the possibility of
bankruptcy, the very essence of corporate failure in the legal environ-
ment of managed care. At this point, only Texas has passed this type
of statute and HMOs have attacked the law via the ERISA statute's
preemption provision.146 Essentially, the managed care industry ar-
gues that ERISA preempts the State of Texas from setting up any type
of mandatory independent review.1 47 On the other hand, Judge Gil-
more, in the initial court decision, found that in addition to the right of
review, the State also had the right to guarantee the patient's right to
sue.1 48 This case is on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and most other
states are waiting to see the outcome prior to going down the same
legislative path.i49
Undoubtedly, if the Fifth Circuit upholds Texas statute, states will
be less likely to wait for another appeal to the Supreme Court before
taking comparable action on their own. The advantage of having a
circuit court opinion to use in fashioning a state's "Right to Sue an
HMO" bill is priceless in terms of fending off attacks by the managed
care industry. Congress holds the key as to exactly how far states will
be able to go in writing statutes allowing patients to take action
outside the ERISA preemption provision. With the stroke of a pen, a
federal bill amending ERISA could include reform to accomplish ex-
actly that, and there does appear to be some inclination on the part of
several members of Congress to achieve that end. i 50
On the other hand, many members of Congress feel that ERISA
ought not to limit patients and are touting a variety of bills aimed at
increasing patient rights and quality care access. These statutes
would guarantee the patient an opportunity to have an independent
review of any managed care decision, and if the patient felt that it
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 628.
147. See id. at 626-628.
148. See id. at 629-30.
149. See Michael Higgins, Second Opinions on HMOs, A.B.A. J., April 1999, at 60, 64-
65; Geyelin, supra note 140.
150. See H.R. Res. 2990, 1061 Cong. (1999), sponsored by Charles Norwood (R-Geor-
gia) and John D. Dingell (D - Michigan), which would make cost-efficiency illegal
in the name of patient protection.
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resulted in liability for which damages were due, there would exist a
right to sue.15 1 All of these statutes are slated for discussion on Capi-
tol Hill this year, and an intensive battle has unfolded between the
supporters of managed care and patient consumer advocates. The lat-
ter believe that managed care promotes saving money over providing
quality healthcare, while the former argue otherwise. Invariably,
managed care companies are large corporations, and must be in order
to provide the kind of cost-wise care that they offer, as well as to meet
the demands of stockholders. This question involves a perceived social
right: does the typical big company MCO have the best interests of the
American consumer in mind or those of the corporate stakeholder?
VII. CONCLUSION
The current primary issue in the healthcare industry is policy pref-
erence. Although medical and economic considerations buttress this
issue, the question still boils down to the manner in which healthcare
should be provided and the limits, if any, that should be placed on the
patient in taking action to hold physicians accountable. The ERISA
statute, standing alone, provides an excellent forum for the opponents
of managed care to argue that the healthcare industry is
unaccountable.
Whether or not a patient can litigate his or her way to quality
healthcare by circumventing ERISA will be answered in the Herdrich
case. The healthcare corporate industry argues that imposing any ad-
ditional potential liability possibilities on MCOs will drive up premi-
ums and make healthcare more difficult to provide, while consumer
and patient advocates argue the opposite. No matter how you cut it
the average patient does not have the clout or the understanding of
the system to go up against a highly financed, highly skilled MCO
with a federal statute expressly protecting its level of liability.
Business-oriented proponents also argue that the more flexibility
taken away from HMOs and MCOs, the greater the reduction in their
ability to manage care and keep costs down. This was, after all, the
very reason that HMOs were created. One possible solution is the im-
plementation of a binding mediated or arbitrated appeal and settle-
ment between the patient and the healthcare provider.152 The
mechanics of this procedure will be contentious, and the solution may
not arrive in time, especially with all the delays built into litigation
procedure and used optimally by MCOs.
In reality, litigation in a managed enviroment will not likely
achieve quality care, but the real hope must be that Mr. Hastings in-
151. See id.
152. See Higgins, supra note 151.
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correctly stated that there is no "Plan B."153 If managed care is the
only cost control option, the whole political landscape of this issue will
change quickly in this century. Citizens may have a myriad of misgiv-
ings about tax policy in this country but the provision of quality, uni-
versal healthcare at an affordable price is not one of them.
Consequently, only the MCOs see no "Plan B," since that is the posi-
tion of maximum profit. Plan B will be developed for managed care
proponents as they watch in dismay. Accordingly, it would be wise if
they simply make hay while the sun shines and observe, despite their
best efforts to keep it from happening, the development of a universal
healthcare provision system by those who consider more than just cost
in making hard decisions. Because, regardless of the decision in Her-
drich v. Pegram,154 the electorate will likely force any judicial solution
to be displaced by a more comprehensive legislative approach.
153. See Hastings, supra note 24.
154. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
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